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Abstract 
We analyze the wage effects of employment breaks of women entering 
motherhood using a novel within-firm matching approach where mothers’ 
wages upon return to the job are compared with those of their female col-
leagues within the same firm. Using an administrative German data set we 
investigate three different matching procedures based on information two 
years before birth: (1) exact matching on individual characteristics, (2) 
propensity score matching and (3) a combined procedure of exact and 
propensity score matching. Our results yield new insights into the nature 
of the wage penalty associated with motherhood, since we find first births 
to reduce women’s wages by 16 to 19 percent, regardless of the matching 
procedure applied. Neglecting the firm identifier and matching across all 
firms, however, yields a wage cut of 30 percent. Furthermore, we can 
show that the wage loss increases with the duration of the employment 
break. 
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wages, parental leave, matching 
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Executive summary 
This paper addresses the question why women with children are observed 
to have lower wages than women without children. This ‘family pay gap’ is 
commonly attributed to differences in employment experience – lower 
human capital formation, respectively human capital depreciation, during 
child-related employment breaks – and differences in job flexibility or ef-
fort between mothers and non-mothers. An alternative explanation is seg-
regation, that is, selection of women who will eventually have children into 
more family-compatible occupations and establishments at the price of 
lower wage earnings. In this case, a pay gap would be observed between 
mothers-to-be and women who will never have children even before the 
event of a child birth and subsequent career intermittence. 
This paper tries to disentangle the segregation effect from the wage effect 
caused by a child-related employment break by drawing on longitudinal 
data of female employees which include wages before and after child 
break. We make use of firm specific effects, as we are able to identify col-
leagues within the same firm. Hence, by applying a semiparametric esti-
mation method based on matching, we compare the wage rate of each 
female employee who experienced a child-related employment break with 
that of a continuously employed but otherwise similar colleague of the 
same firm. By use of various matching procedures this paper provides a 
robust measure of the wage backlog caused by child birth and parental 
leave. 
We find first births to reduce women’s wages by 16 to 19 percent, regard-
less of the matching procedure applied. However, neglecting the firm-
specific effect and matching across all firms, yields a wage cut of 30 per-
cent. Concluding from this result, selection into firms is a major explana-
tory factor of the family pay gap – women with children are more likely to 
be found in firms with lower wage growth – but it does not tell the whole 
story. Even compared to their immediate firm colleagues are mothers’ 
wages negatively affected upon return to the job. As expected, the wage 
loss increases with the duration of the employment break as we can show 
in a subsequent regression analysis. 
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Introduction 
It is an empirical fact that, on average, women with children have lower 
wage rates than women without children. This wage penalty or ‘family pay 
gap’ has been investigated vastly in the United States (see recent evi-
dence by Budig and England 2001, Lundberg and Rose 2000, Waldfogel 
1998a) and in the United Kingdom (Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel 1999, Wald-
fogel, 1998b). Lower wages of mothers may be caused by career intermit-
tence due to child birth and child rearing, but also by a reduced job at-
tachment, hence, a decrease in effort of working mothers. Another promi-
nent source for pay differences may be the occupational segregation of 
mothers-to-be into lower paying jobs or establishments with family-
friendly job or firm characteristics. As the underlying effects are manifold 
and complex, the size of the causal wage loss due to motherhood is diffi-
cult to measure.  
In this paper we examine the backlog of mothers’ wage rates caused by 
parental leave breaks using a novel within-firm-semiparametric approach 
based on matching. That is, we present two innovations: (1) the use of 
firm specific effects and (2) the use of a nonparametric estimation 
method. We compare the wage rate of each female employee who experi-
enced a child-related employment break with that of a continuously em-
ployed but otherwise similar colleague of the same firm. Due to within-
firm matching, unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity can be fully taken 
into account. Selection in observable and unobservable individual charac-
teristics is accommodated by different matching and estimation algo-
rithms. The effect of the employment break duration on the treatment ef-
fect is investigated in a subsequent regression analysis of the wage differ-
ences between the matched pairs.   
Germany is known as a country with one of the most extensive parental 
leave legislations, comprising a mother protection period of 14 weeks and 
a parental leave period of up to 3 years during which the leave taker’s job 
is protected against dismissal. Although both parents are eligible for the 
leave and parents are allowed to switch the leave taker several times, 98 
percent of those on leave are women. In 2000 only 53 percent of mothers 
in West Germany and 70 percent in East Germany were re-employed right 
after the formal leave period (Beckman and Kurtz 2001). The wage effects 
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of such career interruptions have been found to be substantial in Germany 
(see estimations by Beblo and Wolf 2002a and 2002b, Ejrnaes and Kunze 
2004, Kunze 2002 and Ondrich, Spiess and Yang 2001). All of these stud-
ies use extended wage estimations to determine the average wage differ-
ential between women with employment breaks and continuously em-
ployed women. This procedure involves two main problems. First, wage 
regressions represent a parametric approach which relies on the assump-
tion that the functional form is linear in parameters. Second, the esti-
mated wage effect of employment breaks is based on observed wage dif-
ferentials of women working in different firms. Considering that not only 
the wage level, but also the distribution of wages differs across firms (see 
e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger, 1991; Bronars and Famulari, 1997; Abowd, 
Kramarz and Margolis, 1999), standard wage regressions ignoring these 
firm-specific effects on wages may lead to biased results. We try to over-
come these shortcomings by applying a matching approach to estimate 
the wage backlogs of mothers relative to comparable non-mothers and 
assess the differences between colleagues within the same firm. To our 
knowledge, the only study that exploits such an evaluation approach to 
analyze the wages of mothers is provided by Simonsen and Skipper 
(2005, 2006), who do not have a firm identification and thus only com-
pare women across firms.  
The challenge of our research question is to determine what the wage rate 
of a mother would be if she had not given birth and experienced an em-
ployment break within a specific observation period. Since this counterfac-
tual outcome is not observable, we have to identify a control group of fe-
males without employment breaks which is comparable to our selection of 
females giving birth with respect to the distribution of all variables that 
affect the wage determination process. A perfect counterpart for a mother 
would be a childless female colleague who works in the same company, in 
a comparable job, is of comparable age, has experienced the same career 
path, achieved the same educational level and exhibits the same unob-
servable characteristics – such as ability or motivation - potentially affect-
ing the wage rate. As such an ideal counterpart is difficult to find, we pro-
pose three alternative matching procedures to determine a useful control 
group. In all three cases we compare women giving birth to their first 
child (mothers) and women not giving birth during the observation period 
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(“non-mothers”), but being continuously employed within the same firm 
to accommodate firm segregation and unobserved firm-specific effects. 
Furthermore, we apply matching procedures that produce exact matches 
with respect to the working time status and occupation of the women. 
These matching procedures take into account that, following Polachek 
(1981), mothers-to-be may be less attached to the labor market on aver-
age and therefore choose jobs or occupations with rather flat experience 
profiles but smaller expected wage cuts due to discontinuous employment 
patterns. This way, our matching is meant to control for observable and 
unobservable features of mothers-to-be and their employers.  
Once the control group is determined we compare the wage rates of 
mothers and non-mothers before and after the mothers’ employment 
break. We have information on wages right upon return as well as 6 
months, 12 months and 24 months after the end of the break. These 
dates are dynamically determined by the duration of the interruption cho-
sen by the mother. We compare her wage rate with that of the respective 
(set of) control colleague(s) who is (are) observed working in the same 
firm and on the same effective days. The mean difference in wages re-
flects the average treatment-on-the-treated effect of entering motherhood 
and experiencing a specific employment break. We furthermore compare 
the differences in wages of mothers and control colleagues before and af-
ter a break which reflects the conditional difference-in-difference estima-
tor. The wage effect, however, may differ across women due to heteroge-
neity in the duration of the employment interruption. In a subsequent re-
gression analysis we therefore investigate the differences in the wage 
losses using the duration of the employment break as explanatory vari-
able. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents 
our methodological approach. The data is described in Section 3. Section 4 
discusses the results of the alternative matching procedures and the sec-
ond-step wage gap analysis. The last section concludes and discusses po-
tential extensions of our approach. 
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1 Our econometric approach 
The goal of this paper is to determine the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT) on the wage rate, that is, the average expected effect of 
entering motherhood and experiencing an employment break for all em-
ployed mothers-to-be. We follow Rubin (1974) and identify the causal ef-
fect of the “treatment” by comparing the wage rate of a mother after her 
parental leave period with the hypothetical situation of the same woman if 
she had not entered the stage of motherhood.  
Let Y1 denote the wage rate of mothers after returning to their former 
employer and let Y0 denote the wage rate of women who did not interrupt 
their career due to child bearing. Let D be an indicator variable which 
equals one if a woman experienced a parental leave employment break 
and equals zero if not. Then, the ATT is given by:  
1 0( 1) ( 1)E Y D E Y D= − = . 
Since the hypothetical situation 0( 1)E Y D =  cannot be observed for moth-
ers, we have to find alternative ways to estimate the average wage of 
mothers with parental leave experience if they were continuously em-
ployed. According to Heckman, LaLonde, Smith (1999), two alternative 
approaches may be applied to estimate the average non-treatment out-
come, that is in our case, the wage rate of a continuously employed non-
mother: (i) a before-after comparison of mothers or (ii) a comparison with 
a control group of non-mothers. The first approach assumes a constant 
average non-treatment outcome over time for the treated. In other words, 
this approach requires that mothers would have experienced a constant 
wage rate, had they remained childless. This assumption does not hold, 
e.g. if the women would have been promoted otherwise, if their wage 
scales are tenure based or if macroeconomic shocks have taken place. An-
other fundamental problem which applies to both approaches is the poten-
tial selection bias which occurs if mothers differ from both, mothers-to-be 
and non-mothers, due to observable and unobservable characteristics. 
Due to these selection effects, the wage levels of mothers and non-
mothers may be different before the treatment already – for whatever 
reason. In this case, neither a simple cross-section regression of wages 
depending on past parental leave experience nor a before-after compari-
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son would yield unbiased results. Hence, the definition of an appropriate 
control group must be chosen very carefully. We will now briefly discuss 
some approaches to control for selection on observable and unobservable 
characteristics.  
1.1 Controlling for selection on observable characteristics  
To account for differences in observable characteristics, we refer to the 
Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). Under CIA, it does not mat-
ter whether we estimate the average outcome of continuous employment 
based on information about mothers or non-mothers provided that they 
have similar observable characteristics (Imbens 2004): 
 0 0( 1, ) ( 0, )E Y D X E Y D X= = =  
It is therefore important to choose this set of observable characteristics 
carefully. Basically, ( )X  should include the wage rate before treatment and 
all wage determining characteristics. Based on the choice of (X), one can 
select the appropriate control group by means of propensity score match-
ing or exact matching algorithms. As described in Section 2.3, we will ap-
ply both strategies as well as a combination of the two. But when is the 
appropriate point in time to compare the selected characteristics of moth-
ers and non-mothers? Of course, the definition of the control group should 
be based on information before the observed career intermittence of 
mothers. Considering that becoming pregnant is not a fully exogenous 
event and mothers-to-be may be more likely to substitute wage income 
for flexible working conditions (which are difficult to observe in general), 
we should compare mothers-to-be and non-mothers with respect to their 
wage rate and all wage determining characteristics when the employment 
break is not yet a certain event. Since the shape of the wage profile just 
before the first birth might already be affected by the future event (analo-
gously to Ashenfelter’s dip in labor market policy evaluation, see e.g. Ber-
gemann, Fitzenberger, Speckesser 2003), we define our first observation 
point 12 months before conception, respectively 22 months before birth.  
Figure 1 illustrates the time frame of our evaluation approach. At t0, the 
mother gives birth to her child. To account for differences of women with 
and without maternity leave breaks, we match mothers and non-mothers 
at time t-1, assuming that the future pregnancy has not been anticipated 
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yet, at least not in a way related to wages or wage-determining character-
istics. The employment break due to motherhood lasts from t0 to t+1 and 
differs between individuals. At t+1, the mother returns to her former em-
ployer1: t+1, just as t+2, t+3 and t+4 are alternative observation points for 
wage comparisons with the mother’s female colleagues (i.e. her matching 
partners) who are - still or again - working at the same firm.2 
 
Figure 1: Time frame of our evaluation approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2 Controlling for selection on unobservable characteris-
tics  
Given that the fertility choice is very complex, the correction of the selec-
tion bias based on observable characteristics might not be sufficient to 
yield a consistent estimate of the ATT, because unobservable characteris-
tics may be of significant importance. On one hand, women with a prefer-
ence for raising children may anticipate their non-employment spells and 
hence are less willing to invest in their human capital, taking into account 
that the resource “time” of this investment may be very limited. On the 
other hand, it is also conceivable that women whose career has come to a 
halt for some reason are more likely to choose motherhood as a kind of 
fallback way of life than ambitious and career-oriented women who have 
found full satisfaction in their work life. In consideration of these facts, the 
                                                
1 The return to the job is defined as an employment spell of at least 3 months length. 
2 We are aware that this set-up gives rise to yet another source of selection bias since 
the analysis is based on a comparison of firm-stayers only, as regards both mothers 
and control observations. We are planning to perform sensitivity analyses including also 
firm-movers to assess the potential bias associated with our selective sample. 
time
birthconception 
t0 t-1 t-2 
12 months 12 months 12 months 
t+4 
10 m. 
t+1 
Employment break
t+3 t+2 
Matching Wage Comparisons 
Re-employed with same firm
6 m. 6 m. 
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underlying mechanisms affecting fertility and subsequent parental leave 
spells are not fully observable to us.  
Provided that the selection effect due to unobservables is time-invariant 
and linear, Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) propose the difference-
in-difference-estimator (DiD) to yield unbiased results. This estimator ex-
tends the simple before-after comparison by contrasting the before-after 
difference in wage rates of mothers to the wage change of non-mothers 
within the same observation period. According to Heckman, Ichimura and 
Todd (1998), the DiD estimator combined with non-parametric matching, 
the so-called conditional difference-in-difference-estimator, proves very 
useful in controlling for both, selection on observed and unobserved char-
acteristics. 
1.3 Definition of the control group 
The challenge with the measurement of the ATT is to determine the wage 
rate of a mother if she had not given birth to a child and interrupted her 
employment career for this reason. Given that this hypothetical outcome 
is not observable, we have to identify a control group of non-mothers 
which is comparable to the mothers with respect to the distribution of all 
variables which affect the wage determination process. As mentioned 
above, a perfect counterpart for a mother would therefore be a female 
colleague without children who works in the same company in a compara-
ble job, has about the same age, has experienced a comparable past ca-
reer path, achieved the same educational level and exhibits the same un-
observable characteristics potentially affecting the wage rate. It is obvious 
that the ideal counterpart is difficult to find, even if we had full informa-
tion on all female colleagues. Hence, we propose three feasible alterna-
tives to determine a useful control group. 
The most straightforward method of matching, that is exact matching, 
compares persons with exactly the same values of observed characteris-
tics X . Note that this method works only with a limited number of dis-
crete  X -variables or, alternatively, value ranges for continuous X-
variables. The choice of the relevant  X -variables is delicate, because it is 
subject to a trade-off denoted as the “curse of dimensionality”. The higher 
the number of variables selected and the larger the range of values these 
variables may take, the lower is the probability to find an exact match. 
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But, the lower the number of selected variables and the less values these 
variables may take, the more vague is the match, that is, the more un-
equal might be the matched pairs.  
For our first matching procedure we decided to select “exact” matches 
with respect to the establishment, occupation (80 categories), age (with a 
maximum deviation of 2 years), education (3 categories), working time 
status (full/part time), total work experience (with a maximum deviation 
of 20 percent or 30 percent if no colleague could be identified otherwise) 
and daily gross earnings (with a maximum deviation of 10 percent respec-
tively 20 percent). The information which enters the matching procedure 
refers to t-1 in Figure 1 which is 22 months before entering motherhood. 
We denote this procedure as MATCH 1. Exact matching with respect to the 
establishment ensures that treated and untreated women underlie the 
same unobserved fixed effect influencing the wage determination process 
within the establishment. Matching on education and occupation is meant 
to account for unobserved individual heterogeneity affecting the occupa-
tional choice in the sense of Polachek (1981). By conditioning on age and 
experience, we try to account for different stages in the life cycle associ-
ated with the likelihood of maternity and labor market attachment. Educa-
tion levels and working time serve to make daily wages comparable. Since 
there were still a considerable number of controls for most treated obser-
vations, we further accounted for differences in hourly wage rates one 
year before conception. In the case that more than one female colleague 
match the criteria, a control observation is generated by calculating aver-
ages for all variables across all selected colleagues. The quality of this 
matching procedure and the percentage of treated observations with an 
appropriate control and the average number of control observations – 
conditional on finding at least one control - are discussed in Section 4.1. 
Due to the curse of dimensionality, exact matching is not capable of pro-
viding an appropriate control in all dimensions and for all mothers. We 
therefore use an inexact matching procedure in the second application 
(MATCH 2). Propensity score matching reduces the dimension problem by 
defining a distance metric on X  and subsequent matching is based on the 
distance metric rather than the X . Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) illus-
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trate, that the distance metric may be defined as: ( ) Pr( 1 )P X D X= = .3  
Hence, we estimate a parametric probit model to predict the individual 
propensity score ( )P X . In our setting, this figure describes the likelihood 
of becoming a mother and returning to a full-time job within the observa-
tion period for each individual in the sample. The vector (X) hence in-
cludes all variables presumably affecting motherhood and subsequent em-
ployment. Given the limited information about the household context in 
our data, we basically include information on age, education, the current 
occupation and the past employment history. The next issue we have to 
deal with is the choice of the appropriate matching algorithm. The most 
common form is the nearest neighbor matching (NNM) selecting one or 
more untreated observations whose ( )P X  is closest to that of the mother. 
A very appealing alternative which makes use of all potential comparison 
observations, hence holding variance low, is kernel matching (KM).  
Given that the number of comparison observations is small for some 
mothers – namely those working in small establishments (see Table 1) – 
we try both matching algorithms. First, we apply NNM with replacement in 
order to keep the bias small. As the choice of the number of nearest 
neighbors is subject to a trade-off between bias and variance, we choose 
one neighbor, being aware that the variance may be high. Note that all 
pairs have to belong to the same establishment in order to control for un-
observed firm-specific effects influencing the wage determination process. 
To restrict the differences between the nearest neighbors – which tend to 
be larger in smaller firms – we define a caliper of 0.5. Matching more than 
one nearest neighbor increases the bias, while the variance of the match 
becomes smaller. Therefore, we secondly apply a KM with an Epanech-
nikov kernel4. Considering that comparison observations – that is all fe-
male colleagues of mothers – are numerous in the full sample but asym-
metrically distributed across firms– mothers in small firms have fewer po-
tential counterparts whereas mothers in bigger firms are more likely to 
                                                
3 The intuition behind the propensity score matching is that individuals with the same 
probability of “participation”, that is becoming a mother, can be paired for purpose of 
comparison. 
4 A normal kernel is less appropriate in our setting, because it would rely on all potential 
control observations – irrespective whether they work in the same firm or not. 
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have more adequate matches – kernel matching is especially helpful be-
cause it exploits additional data when available but it does not rely on bad 
matches where close neighbors do not exist. The results serve to check 
the robustness of the NNM results, but are not discussed in detail.  
As a third matching algorithm, we combine the two traditional matching 
approaches described into one procedure (MATCH 3). In a first step, we 
select exact matches with respect to the establishment, working time, oc-
cupation and total work experience (with a maximum deviation of 20 per-
cent). Obviously the number of untreated counterfactual observations is 
much bigger than in MATCH 1. In a second step, we use the propensity 
score determined by the MATCH 2 procedure in order to define a compa-
rable control group beyond the pre-matching from step 1 by nearest 
neighbor matching. The advantage of this third procedure is that not only 
unobserved firm characteristics affecting the wage determination process 
within the establishment are accommodated, but also unobserved individ-
ual heterogeneity affecting the occupational choice and the overall career 
path. Note that all of the three matching algorithms allow the control 
group to contain mothers, under the condition that they delivered their 
children before 1997 and were continuously employed during our observa-
tion period.   
1.4 Wage comparison 
Once the control groups are determined, we calculate the difference in the 
wage rates of mothers and non-mothers at different points in time. As il-
lustrated in Figure 1, we consider wages right upon return as well as 6 
months, 12 months and 24 months after the break. The timing of these 
dates is determined by the duration of the career interruption of the 
mother. In this analysis, we compare her wage rate 12 months after reen-
tering the labor market (in t+3) with that of the respective (set of) control 
colleague(s) – defined by the matching process in t-1 – who is (are) still 
working in the same firm5.  The differences in individual wages determine 
the average treatment-on-the-treated effect (ATT) of being a mother.  
                                                
5 We chose t+3 to compare wage rates after the employment break because – out of ad-
ministrative reasons - the identification of part-time employment is more reliable when 
the calendar year has changed. 
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The treatment effect, however, may depend on the duration of the em-
ployment interruption. In a regression analysis, we therefore investigate 
the effect of duration of the employment break on the average wage dif-
ferential between mothers and women without employment breaks. 
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2 Data 
The merit of our empirical analysis is significantly nourished by the 
uniqueness of our data set that allows longitudinal comparisons between 
mothers and non-mothers within the same firm. We draw on process gen-
erated data provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). 
These German register data are generated by an integrated notifying pro-
cedure for the public health insurance, statutory pension scheme and un-
employment insurance which was introduced in 1973. By law, employers 
have to provide information to the social security agencies for employees 
acquiring claims to the social security system. These notifications are re-
quired at the beginning and ending of any employment relationship. In 
addition, employers are obliged to provide an annual report for each em-
ployee who is employed on December 31st of each year and covered by 
social insurance. The reports include information on sex, year of birth, na-
tionality, occupation, qualification and gross wage rate of the employee. 
Furthermore, each spell includes information on the industry and a unique 
firm identifier of the establishment where an individual is employed. Ac-
cording to the obligation to register with the state pension authorities, this 
data encompasses all persons who have paid contributions to the pension 
system or who have been covered by the pension system through contri-
butions by the unemployment insurance or by being a parent. As a conse-
quence, certain groups of employees are not covered by the data:   
• (Temporary) civil servants or self-employed persons  
• Women who are employed in East Germany or abroad. 
The latter selection is necessary because the supplementary information 
on the nature of employment breaks is available for workers employed in 
West Germany only. Nevertheless, the sample represents still about 80% 
of all employees on the labor market6.   
We use two different samples of these register data. We combine the IAB 
employment sample with additional administrative data assembled at the 
                                                
6 Due to the nature of the data we do not have any information on the household back-
ground, such as the household income, the partner’s employment status etc. 
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state pension authorities (IAB employment supplement sample I).7 Both 
data sets can be linked by the social security number. The matched file 
contains a 1% random sample of the total German population having been 
gainfully employed at least for one day between 1975 and 1995 (for de-
tails see Bender, Haas, and Klose 2000). Based on the supplement sam-
ple, we have exact information about the individuals’ entire working lives 
that allows us to distinguish between different types of “non-working” pe-
riods, namely, unemployment, formal parental leave, illness, disability, 
care for other people, full-time education, military or civil service and 
other out-of-the-labor-force spells. Furthermore, these data allow us to 
identify the fertility history of all women. Since the birth of children in-
creases the pension entitlement of the mother, IAB employment supple-
ment sample I provides exact information about the number of children as 
well as the month of birth.8  
Based on the exact information about fertility and employment history, we 
select our treatment group, that is, women who have given birth to their 
first child between 1987 and 1995. Since we are interested in the wage 
effects of parental leave periods, we further restrict the sample to women 
who have been working ten months and 22 months before the birth of 
their first child and, after the employment break, returned to the same 
firm for at least three months within our observation period, that is until 
1999. After deleting observations with missing values, we remain with 
1,390 observations of mothers. 
As described in Section 2.3, the innovation of our analysis is to measure 
the backlog of mothers’ wages by comparing mothers’ and non-mothers’ 
wages within the same firm. Hence, the control group has to be drawn 
from a sample of all colleagues of these 1,390 mothers selected in the 
first step. To do so, we make use of the so-called Employment Statistics 
                                                
7 For first descriptive analyses with these data see Prinz (1997), for an analysis of the 
wage penalties of heterogeneous employment biographies see Beblo and Wolf (2002 a 
and b) and for the effects of entry into motherhood on women’s employment dynamics 
see Bender, Kohlmann and Lang (2003). 
8 Under very restrictive assumptions, it is possible to interpret specific gaps in the IAB 
employment sample as interruptions due to parental leave or national service (see e.g. 
Kunze 2002: 11). An exact identification of a child birth, however, is only possible with 
the supplementary file. 
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Register, which includes information about the total population of all peo-
ple who are registered in the social security system. The following proce-
dure describes our strategy to identify all female colleagues of our treat-
ment group, that is, women who became mothers between 1987 and 
1995 and were employed before and after their parental leave spell: 
1. We identify the treatment group in the Employment Statistics Register. 
2. We identify the unique firm number of every observation in the treat-
ment group.  
3. We select all women, who were employed in t-1 and t+3 (or t+4) in the 
identified firms.  
After this selection, the data set consists of 307,541 observations of po-
tential control women9.  Due to missing observations of selected variables, 
1,357 mothers and 298,822 female colleagues enter the propensity score 
estimation, which is required for two of our estimation procedures. For the 
purpose of wage comparison, we further restrict our sample to women in 
full-time employment one year after the mothers’ return to the job (in 
t+3). We end up with 566 mothers and 233,358 female colleagues, for 
whom we have information on wages after the employment break as well 
as wages and individual characteristics 22 months before birth. Being 
aware that our population is very selective in terms of the attachment to 
the labor market our results may be interpreted as a lower bound to the 
overall short-run wage effects of entering motherhood. 
Figure 2 illustrates the average wage rates10 of the selected mothers and 
female colleagues before and after the mothers’ employment break. It is 
                                                
9 Since the selection of our treatment group is based on a 1% sample and the group of 
potential controls is drawn from the total population, this sampling procedure yields an 
oversampling of control observations. Given that the 1% sample of the total population 
(that is the supplement sample I) is completely random, we do not require weights to 
consistently estimate the probability of entering motherhood, such as in the case of 
choice-based sampling of the treatment group. 
10 Wage information in the employment register is censored at the upper bound. Estima-
tion strategies may be used to impute wages above this ceiling (see for example Gart-
ner 2005). We are using the original wage information, because we do not have many 
women above the threshold level. This way, we may underestimate the wage losses of 
mothers who start above this level, if their wages are falling below after the break. 
Likewise, we will underestimate the wage increases of non-mothers if their wages rise 
above the ceiling. 
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obvious that already 22 months before birth mothers-to-be earn lower 
wages on average than their colleagues. Presumably, this wage differen-
tial is caused by differences in observed characteristics for the most part. 
Interestingly, pre-birth wage growth does not seem to differ between fu-
ture mothers and their control group. After the employment break, the 
gap between mothers and women without comparable employment breaks 
becomes even greater. While the female colleagues experience an almost 
linear wage growth, mothers’ wage profiles exhibit a sharp decline and 
hardly reach the level from 22 months before birth (t-2) even two years 
after the end of the employment break (t+4) . 
Figure 2: Average wages of mothers (Treat) and their female colleagues (Con-
trol) before and after birth 
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Source: Sample of 566 mothers (child birth between 1987 and 1995) and 233,358 female colleagues, 
drawn from the IAB employment sample, IAB employment supplement sample I, Employment 
statistics register. Wages in DM (German marks). 1 DM equals 0.51 euro. 
 
Figure 3 describes the duration of employment breaks of first-time moth-
ers in our sample. The majority of these women drop out of the labor 
market for up to 21 months and the average takes 18 months off – condi-
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tional on returning to a full-time position with the same employer thereaf-
ter. Only a negligible fraction of mothers returns to work within the first 3 
months following birth, which is mostly due to the maternity protection 
period of 8 weeks. Remember that the maternity leave legislation changed 
substantially during our observation period. Starting from 10 months in 
1987 the maximum leave duration increased up to 36 months as of 1992. 
On average, about 30% of mothers stay away from the firm for more than 
the relevant maximum legal parental leave period with a guaranteed re-
turn to a status-adequate job. It is interesting to note that the share of 
women prolonging the parental leave beyond the job-protected period dif-
fers tremendously by year. While the majority of women who first became 
mother between 1989 and 1991 did not return to their former job within 
the parental leave period, this fraction declined to less than 14 percent in 
1992. 
Figure 3: Duration of mothers’ employment breaks 
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Source: Sample of 566 mothers (child birth between 1987 and 1995) and 233,358 female colleagues, 
drawn from the IAB employment sample, IAB employment supplement sample I, Employment 
statistics register. 
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3 Results  
3.1 Matching  
To perform the second and third matching procedure, a distance metric 
for the propensity of entering motherhood is required. In Table 1, the es-
timation results of a probit estimation of the likelihood of becoming a 
mother at time t0 conditional on individual characteristics at time t-1 are 
presented. Due to the lack of data, no information on the household back-
ground such as household composition, partner’s employment status or 
earnings etc. can be considered. To determine differences with respect to 
the family situation, we exploit all available individual information which 
might correlate with the likelihood of having children. Age enters the 
equation with a linear and a quadratic term, both of which are statistically 
significant. Women without an apprenticeship training certificate have a 
lower probability of having a child than skilled employees. This likelihood 
is greatest for college and university graduates. This result seems plausi-
ble once we take into account that we only consider mothers who return 
to their full-time job within our observation period of nine years. The wage 
rate at t-1 is negatively related to future motherhood, indicating that op-
portunity costs do matter. Married women are more likely to become 
mothers whereas those working part time are less likely.  
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Table 1: Probit estimation results of becoming a mother at time t0 
 
 Coeff. estimate Std. error 
Age 0.5515  0.031 
Age2/100 -0.9428 0.050 
Education level (ref. apprenticeship)   
No apprenticeship -0.1081 0.030 
College/Univ. graduate 0.5184 0.057 
Occupational status (ref. unskilled blue collar)   
Skilled blue collar 0.3373 0.063 
Skilled white collar 0.1556 0.057 
Occupational group (ref. unskill. manual labor)   
Agriculture 0.4126 0.159 
Qualified manual labor 0.0469 0.060 
Technicians 0.1318 0.075 
Engineering 0.2309 0.139 
Services 0.1860 0.058 
Qualified services 0.3741 0.069 
Semiprofessionals 0.1870 0.065 
Professionals 0.2746 0.141 
Business - Accounting 0.2270 0.064 
Business - Administration 0.2574 0.063 
Management 0.7956 0.116 
Part time -0.3222 0.059 
Daily wage rate -0.0081 0.000 
Work experience in past 4 years -0.0215 0.002 
Employment breaks (in month) >93 days -0.0301 0.003 
No. of employment breaks (>31 days) -0.1395 0.026 
Tenure 0.0021 0.000 
Average wage growth in past 4 years 0.0043 0.029 
Constant -8.6536 0.487 
Pseudo R squared 0.1222  
χ2(24) 2122  
No. of observations 300,179  
 
Source: Sample of 1,357 mothers (child birth between 1987 and 1995) and 298,822 female col-
leagues, drawn from the IAB employment sample, IAB employment supplement sample I, 
Employment statistics register. 
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The negative coefficient for the part time dummy may be explained by our 
selection of the sample as we only study first births. Hence, most part 
timers are women who have children already and serve as control per-
sons. We find significant differences between occupational groups as well 
as between blue and white collar workers. We finally include a set of vari-
ables describing the past employment history. These are meant to account 
for selection into motherhood, as mothers-to-be and women who do not 
plan to have children may follow differing employment paths from the 
start of the career. However, the results are ambiguous. Not surprisingly, 
intermittent work histories tend to reduce the likelihood of entering moth-
erhood and returning to the same firm. Active labor market participation 
during the past four years (as a proxy for career orientation) has a nega-
tive effect on entering our treatment group, while tenure within the same 
firm increases the propensity to become a mother and return to the for-
mer employer. The average yearly wage growth during the last four years 
does not significantly affect the probability to belong to the treatment 
group.  
Due to data restrictions, we evaluate the wage effects of temporary labor 
market drop-outs due to motherhood one year after the mother’s return 
to her job11.  For the time being, we furthermore restrict our analysis to 
full-time employees, because we do not have information about the num-
ber of working hours in part time jobs. As mentioned before, we end up 
with 566 mothers and 233.358 female colleagues, for whom we have in-
formation on wages after the employment break as well as wages and in-
dividual characteristics 22 months before birth. 
Since mothers in small firms are likely to have only few female colleagues 
whereas mothers in large firms tend to have more female colleagues, the 
number of potential control observations per treated observation is very 
unequally distributed (see Table 2). While 9.5 % of all treated observa-
tions have no female colleague – and hence drop out – and 7.8 % moth-
ers have just 1 control observation, there is one case where we identify 
                                                
11 Since the employer‘s record on whether an employee changes from full-time to part-
time is not mandatory during the year, this type of information is more reliable after 
a new employment spell has started, that is in general, at the beginning of the next 
calendar year. 
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7159 potential control observations for one specific mother. According to 
Table 2 about 63 % of the treatment group are employed in firms where 
we can identify at least 10 potential control observations. Because of this 
ratio between mothers and potential control persons in the same firm we 
do not expect to find a comparable female colleague for each mother. 
Table 2: Number of control persons 
 
Control 
observa-
tions  
Percent of mothers 
with ... control obser-
vations  
0 9.54 
1 7.77 
2 4.95 
3 3.53 
4 2.83 
5 1.41 
6 1.41 
7 1.24 
8 1.06 
9 1.77 
10 1.41 
>10 63.07 
 
Source: Sample of 566 mothers (child birth between 1987 and 1995) and 233.358 female colleagues 
(full-time employed in t+3), drawn from the IAB employment sample, IAB employment sup-
plement sample I, Employment statistics register. 
 
Table 3 compares the mean characteristics of the selected mothers and 
their alternative control groups before treatment, that is, at time t-1, 12 
months before conception. Note that the numbers of observations in the 
group of mothers differ between the different matching approaches. Due 
to the strict matching criterion in MATCH 1, based on occupation, age, 
education, work experience and before break gross earnings, the number 
of appropriate control observations is much smaller compared to MATCH 2 
and MATCH 3. While the exact matching provides appropriate control ob-
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servations for 196 mothers only, the number of matched pairs based on 
MATCH 2 amounts to 449.12  
While the average wage rate of mothers-to-be is continuously lower than 
the wage rate of women who do not interrupt their career due to child 
bearing (see column 1 in Table 3 and Figure 2), the selected control ob-
servations within the same firm seem to earn lower wage rates than the 
selected mothers 22 months before the date of birth. Comparing the dif-
ferent matching algorithms, it turns out that MATCH 1 and 3 seem to bet-
ter balance the pre-birth wage differentials than MATCH 2. With respect to 
the other characteristics, such as age, education level or occupation, the 
superiority of any of the matching algorithms is not obvious. MATCH 1, for 
instance, turns out to be very effective in balancing age differences and 
MATCH 3 performs best with respect to tenure. Both the education level 
as well as job status are matched quite well in all three models. The fact 
that the potential and selected control groups exhibit even more and 
longer employment breaks within the past five years than the mothers-to-
be (except for the control group in MATCH 3) leads one to suppose that 
part of the selected colleagues entered motherhood already before the 
start of our observation period and therefore experienced a less continu-
ous employment path on average. We will consider this peculiarity in the 
assessment of our estimation results in Section 5. 
                                                
12 In Section 4.3, we will expound how the number of matched pairs depends upon the 
specific matching procedures. 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 13/2006   
 
 
27
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for mothers and control groups 
 
 Raw data MATCH 1 MATCH2 
(caliper = 0.5) 
MATCH 3  
(caliper = 0.5) 
 Mother Potential 
Controls 
Mother Selected 
Controls 
Mother Se-
lected 
Controls 
Mother Selected 
Controls 
Characteristics (at time t-1) Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Daily wage in DM 120.72 147.61 128.38 126.64 126.76 117.41 129.33 125.31 
Age 28.73 32.90 28.14 28.17 28.75 29.50 28.64 29.10 
No apprenticeship 0.20 0.30 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.27 0.24 
Apprenticeship 0.76 0.66 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.74 0.71 0.74 
College/Univ. graduate 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 
Work experience last 4 
years 44.41 44.71 45.38 44.79 44.64 44.56 45.73 46.01 
Past employment breaks 
(in months) 2.02 2.92 1.50 1.82 1.98 2.49 1.38 1.09 
No. of past employment 
breaks 0.24 0.30 0.18 0.26 0.23 0.29 0.18 0.12 
Tenure 60.92 70.19 67.66 66.02 62.70 58.18 69.44 70.31 
Unskilled worker, full time 0.20 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.28 
Skilled worker, full time 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04 
White collar, full time 0.73 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.71 0.67 0.69 0.68 
Mean standardized bias  3.87 6.80 3.03 
No. of obs. 566 233,358 196 449 233 
 
Source: Source: Sample of 566 mothers (child birth between 1987 and 1995) and 233.358 female 
colleagues (full-time employed in t+3), drawn from the IAB employment sample, IAB employ-
ment supplement sample I, Employment statistics register. 1 DM (German mark) equals 0.51 
euro. 
 
To get an idea of the quality of the three matching procedures, we apply 
different tests. One way to evaluate the performance of the match is to 
calculate the mean standardized bias (MSB) among the covariates of 
mothers-to-be and non-mothers 22 months before birth (that is, at time t-
1). This measure is given by the absolute difference in means divided by 
the square root of the average of the two associated variances and multi-
plied by 100. Taking the average of all variables yields an indicator that is 
decreasing with the match quality. The standardized bias can be inter-
preted as bias in percent of the average standard deviation. Since there is 
no fixed threshold saying whether the applied matching procedure is doing 
well or not, we use this indicator to compare the three alternatives 
amongst themselves (see e.g. Lechner, 2002). To generate a comparable 
measure for all three matching algorithms, we refer to all variables used 
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to model the probability of treatment at time t-1 (see Table 2). The MSB 
amounts to 3.03 for MATCH 3, which represents the relatively best per-
formance. MATCH 2 performs much worse with MSB of 6.80, while MATCH 
1 reduces the MSB to 3.87.  
3.2 Wage effects 
As can be seen in Table 4, the average wages of the mother samples and 
the respective control samples differ quite remarkably between the raw 
data and the selected individuals after matching according to the three 
matching procedures. The wage difference before treatment even changes 
size: in the raw data set the control group receives a higher average wage 
rate than the mothers-to-be whereas in MATCH 1 wages hardly differ and 
in MATCH 2 and MATCH 3 the higher wage earners are found among 
mothers. 
Table 4: Daily wages before and after treatment (in DM) 
 
 Raw data MATCH 1 MATCH 2 
 (NN, caliper 0.5) 
MATCH 3 
 (NN, caliper 0.5) 
 Before after before after before After before after 
Control group  147.61 167.78 126.64 141.91 117.41 136.72 125.31 143.90 
Mothers 120.72 107.92 128.38 118.78 126.76 115.19 129.33 120.23 
Wage difference (ATT)  -59.85  -23.13  -21.52  -23.68 
Conditional DiD  -32.96  -24.87  -30.87  -27.69 
# mothers  566  196  449  233 
# control persons  233,358  196  449  233 
 
Source: Sample of 566 mothers (child birth between 1987 and 1995) and 233,358 female colleagues 
(full-time employed in t+3), drawn from the IAB employment sample, IAB employment supple-
ment sample I, Employment statistics register. 1 DM (German mark) equals 0.51 euro. 
 
A look at the average wage rates of mothers and their corresponding con-
trol colleagues, one year after re-entry into the job, indicates that the 
post-treatment outcome of mothers is substantially lower compared to 
their controls. While mothers’ daily wage rates fall by 13 DM between t-1 
and t+3, the potential control colleagues’ wage rates increase by 20 DM, 
which equals about 28 percent (see also Figure 1). The unmatched wage 
difference between mothers and controls in t+3 amounts to almost 60 DM 
(30.50 €) which is about 35%. The absolute values of the ATT differ 
slightly by the matching procedure applied. The matched gap is 23 DM 
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(MATCH 1), respectively 21.50 DM (MATCH 2) or almost 24 DM (MATCH 
3), which translates into an average wage cut of about 16-17 percent with 
respect to the control colleague’s wage. Even if the ATTs do not vary that 
much across the specific matching algorithms, the results provide some 
indication that MATCH 1 and MATCH 3 result in higher wage effects of 
child-related employment breaks.   
The measures presented so far provide a consistent estimate of the ATT if 
selection into motherhood is based on observable characteristics only. 
Given that the propensity score matching in MATCH 2 does not fully elimi-
nate the differences between mothers with employment breaks and con-
tinuously employed women, we calculate the conditional difference-in-
difference estimate (cDiD). This before-after comparison of the wage dif-
ferences between mothers and their controls takes account of a sorting 
process due also to unobservable characteristics or characteristics poorly 
measured by our variables at hand. Since the pre-birth wage rates of the 
selected mothers are higher than those of their counterfactual female col-
leagues – this is especially true for MATCH 2 – the cDiD wage effects are 
constantly larger than the ATTs. The cDiD ranges between 25 DM (MATCH 
1) and 31 DM (MATCH 2) and thus suggests a negative impact of unob-
servables on the relative after-break wages of mothers. However, this 
measure only provides a more accurate estimate of the treatment effect of 
entering motherhood than the basic ATT if the unobservables are time-
invariant and linear. In the case when young women, prior to having their 
first child, are particularly ambitious in reaching a certain position within 
the firm or when women, after just having been promoted, decide to enter 
motherhood, the assumption of time-invariant unobservables might not be 
the most appropriate. In the lack of full information on this complex field 
of fertility choice (and the partner matching process) we prefer to inter-
pret both measures, the basic ATT and the cDiD as providing us with an 
interval of the possible treatment effect of entering motherhood and ex-
periencing an employment break. Hence, we conclude that the treatment 
effect lies somewhere between 16.5 and 19 percent. After all, this appears 
to be a comparatively robust measure, no matter whether we draw on 
pure propensity score matching, which might have the drawback of not 
fully capturing unobserved heterogeneity between treatment and control 
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group, or on exact matching, which suffers from a very small sample size, 
or on the combined procedure of exact and propensity score matching. 
In contrast to most other studies measuring the wage effect of entering 
motherhood, our data allow us to accommodate firm-specific fixed effects. 
This aspect may be important if firms differ with respect to their average 
individual wage growth. If, for example, women with a high likelihood of 
becoming mother select into booming firms, which offer a variety of ca-
reer ladders and whose jobs are regarded as stepping-stones, ignoring 
firm-specific heterogeneity would tend to overestimate the true backlog in 
wages. In contrast, the expected wage loss of entering motherhood is un-
derestimated if mothers-to-be select into firms whose employees have 
rather stable wage rates. To test these hypotheses, we calculated the ATT 
based on MATCH 2 ignoring firm specific fixed effects, that is, we match 
across all potential control women and not only within the same firm (see 
Table 5).13  The ATT significantly increases in this specification. That is, 
compared to all female employees across firms, mothers loose almost 
44.50 DM per day, which amounts to a wage drop of about 29 %. The 
cDiD also increases from 31 to 39 DM. This leads one to suppose that 
women who are to get children are more likely to work in firms with lower 
wage growth rates. 
                                                
13 The distribution of the propensity score values of mothers and their potential controls 
are presented in the appendix. This graph does, however, only refer to the matching 
across all potential control women. The support problem in the case of within-firm 
propensity matching is addressed by applying a caliper of 0.5. 
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Table 5: Wage effects within and across firms (in DM) 
 
 MATCH 2 within firms 
 (NN, caliper 0.5) 
MATCH 2 across firms 
 (NN, caliper 0.5) 
 before after before after 
Control group  117.41 136.72 126.25 152.40 
Mothers 126.76 115.19 120.72 107.92 
Wage difference (ATT)  -21.52  -44.47 
Conditional DiD  -30.87  -38.95 
# mothers  449  566 
# control persons  449  566 
 
Source: Sample of 566 mothers (child birth between 1987 and 1995) and 233.358 female colleagues 
(full-time employed in t+3), drawn from the IAB employment sample, IAB employment supplement 
sample I, Employment statistics register. 1 DM (German mark) equals 0.51 euro. 
 
Until now, we considered only average effects across all women who be-
came mother between 1987 and 1995. One major reason for differences 
in the child-related wage cut is the amount of time spent out of the labor 
market (see e.g. Figure 2). A simple way to see how the duration of an 
employment break is related to a mother’s wage cut is to run a linear re-
gression, where the wage differences after matching are conditioned on 
the time out of work: 
.44 εβα +⋅+=− ++ tttct breakww  
The term tt
c
t ww 44 ++ −  denotes the differences in wage rates between moth-
ers and their matched colleagues, where t refers to the treated mothers 
and c to the selected control observations. tbreak  represents the duration 
of the employment break (in years) of the mother. α  and β  are parame-
ters to be estimated and ε  is the error term. In principle, this procedure 
allows us to calculate group-specific treatment effects for mothers with 
employment breaks of different length. The estimation result indicates 
that every year out of work reduces the daily wage rate by almost 6 DM 
( β  equals 5.89 with a t-value of 2.24).14 Alternative specifications, allow-
                                                
14  Alternatively, we used the cDiD wage gap between mothers and their colleagues. The 
impact of the employment break on the wage rate is less obvious in this specification 
( β  equals 2.57 with a t-value of 1.72).  
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ing a non-linear relationship between the wage loss and the duration of 
the employment break (e.g. by using dummy variables for different break 
durations or adding a squared term), seem to suggest that the marginal 
wage effect does not change with duration. That is, the first year out of 
work is more or less as “expensive” as the fifth year. 
3.3 Sensitivity analyses  
It may be of concern that our strict matching criterions in MATCH 1 and 
MATCH 3 lead to a considerable reduction of the number of observations, 
associated with smaller estimated wage losses due to the better matching. 
Applying a caliper in the NNM also yields better matches on the one hand, 
but reduces the number of observation on the other. In order to see, how 
the effects change if we allow more heterogeneity among mothers and 
their colleagues, we now present the results on alternative matching 
specifications. Furthermore, we will check the sensitivity of the propensity 
score matching with respect to the matching algorithm, that is, we also 
present kernel matches in MATCH 2 and MATCH 3. To make sure that only 
women within the same firm are selected as appropriate matches, we 
choose an Epanechnikov kernel. 
Table 6: Results of alternative matching specifications 
 
 MATCH 1  
(less strict) 
(1) 
MATCH 2 
(kernel) 
(2) 
MATCH 2  
(NN no caliper) 
(3) 
MATCH 3  
(less strict) 
(4) 
MATCH 3 
(kernel) 
(5) 
MATCH 3  
(NN no caliper) 
(6) 
ATT - 23.48 - 22.69 - 28,12 - 22.54 -24.10 - 36.96 
cDiD - 25.05 - 31.03 - 30.85 - 29.02 - 29.15 - 30.22 
# mothers 266 449 512 361 236 512 
 
Source: Total sample of 566 mothers (child birth between 1987 and 1995) and 233,358 female col-
leagues (full-time employed in t+3), drawn from the IAB employment sample, IAB employment 
supplement sample I, Employment statistics register. 1 DM (German mark) equals 0.51 euro. 
 
The first column of Table 6 gives the results of the exact matching algo-
rithm (MATCH 1) with less strict matching criterions. In contrast to our 
initial model, we do not balance the samples of mothers and selected con-
trol observations with respect to employment experience. Compared to 
the stricter exact matching presented in Table 4, the number of observa-
tions increases by 35% but the results hardly change.  
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The second column describes the wage effect based on MATCH 2 with 
Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 0.5. The results indicate that our 
baseline model of MATCH 2 (NNM with caliper 0.5) and the kernel match-
ing yield very similar effects. This implies that the trade-off between bias 
and variance does not seem to be that severe in our case. If, however, 
the nearest neighbor is not restricted to be within a certain range (see 
column 3), all mothers working in a firm with at least one female col-
league are taken into account and the ATT respective cDiD increases by 
almost 7 respective 6 DM. These rather large differences compared to the 
baseline model of MATCH 2 become plausible if we think about a mother-
to-be in a small firm with only one female colleague. If their propensities 
to become a mother within the next 22 months differ noticeable, we would 
also expect that differences in their observed and unobserved characteris-
tics yield significant wage differentials. Applying a caliper means skipping 
these observations and hence reduces the resulting wage differential.  
Finally we compare different specifications of MATCH 3. First, we relax the 
criterions of the exact pre-matching; more precisely, we skip the experi-
ence criterion and select all colleagues who are in the same occupation 
and work the same number of hours as those women who enter mother-
hood (see column 4). The number of observations increases by about 55 
%. Whereas the ATT becomes smaller by more than 1 DM, the cDiD in-
creases by about the same amount. This contradictory result leads one to 
suggest that the less strict matching procedure is not able to fully account 
for the heterogeneity among mothers and controls. Hence, interpreting 
the cDiD seems to be more appropriate. Even though, the difference be-
tween the strict pre-matching and these results are not tremendous. Sec-
ond, we apply an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth 0.5 (see column 5). 
Compared to our baseline model of MATCH 3 (see Table 4), the wage gap 
due to a child-related employment break increases by 0.4 DM (ATT) re-
spectively 1.40 DM (cDiD). Hence, the differences can be regarded as 
small. As in the case of MATCH 2, abandoning the caliper increases the 
estimated wage effects dramatically (see column 6 of Table 6). 
Based on the variety of sensitivity analyses, we conclude that applying a 
rather large caliper of 0.5 reduces both, the number of observations as 
well as the estimated wage effect. Alternative specifications with respect 
to the matching algorithm or the pre-matching criterions, however, do not 
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affect the results. We therefore conclude that our model specifications 
presented in Table 4 – aiming at reducing the heterogeneity between 
women entering motherhood and their female colleagues – do not really 
suffer from small sample sizes. Relaxing the matching criterion to a rea-
sonable degree does in fact increase the number of observations, but does 
not change the general result that women entering motherhood have a 25 
to 30 DM lower daily wage one year after they returned to their job.   
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4 Conclusions 
In this study we examine the backlog of mothers’ wage rates due to the 
birth of their first child using a novel within-firm-semiparametric approach 
based on matching. With data of the IAB employment sample and addi-
tional administrative data assembled at the state pension authorities (IAB 
employment supplement sample I), we can identify all women working in 
the same firm. Hence, we match each female employee who experienced 
a child-related employment break with a female colleague of the same 
firm without a comparable employment break. Due to within-firm match-
ing, unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity can be fully taken into ac-
count. Selection in observable and unobservable individual characteristics 
is accommodated by different matching and estimation algorithms.  
Our findings point to a substantial wage cut of mothers upon return to 
their job. Even when confining the comparison to women returning to full-
time employment, mothers’ wages are by 16.5 to 19 percent lower rela-
tive to those of their female colleagues with comparable characteristics 22 
months before entering motherhood. We interpret our results as a lower 
bound to the overall short-run wage effects of entering motherhood for 
two reasons. First, our treated population is very selective in terms of la-
bor market attachment because we only consider women who worked be-
fore the birth of their first child. Second, they have to return to a full-time 
position within our observation period. Note that most of the wage loss of 
women entering motherhood results from the fact that their female col-
leagues experience significant wage growth in the meanwhile. But even in 
absolute terms, the average real wage after a maternity break is slightly 
lower than before entering motherhood.  
Interestingly, the pre-treatment wages of mothers-to-be are equal or 
higher than their control groups’ once we apply our matching procedures. 
This finding hints at a negative selection into motherhood based on ob-
servable characteristics and a positive selection based on unobservable 
characteristics with respect to the wage level. As a result, the before-after 
comparison of the wage rates of mothers and non-mothers yield even lar-
ger wage cuts due to motherhood and a career interruption. Our firm-
specific information provides further insight into the sorting of women into 
firms. Since the ATT is significantly higher as soon as we ignore firm-
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specific fixed effects, we conclude that women who plan to get children 
are more likely to work in firms with lower wage growth rates, be it be-
cause of anticipative sorting into these firms or sorting into motherhood. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1 illustrates the predicted linear index from the propensity score 
estimation for the sample of mothers (black line) and the sample of all 
possible control persons (dashed line). The likelihoods of entering mother-
hood and taking parental leave of the group of mothers and the potential 
control group do not overlap over the whole range of values. However, 
since the propensity scores of future mothers are distributed quite nar-
rowly, they are covered by the scores taken by the control colleagues for 
the major part of the distribution. 
 
Figure A1: Kernel densities of the propensity scores of all mothers and possi-
ble controls 
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Note: Propensity scores based on the estimation results presented in Table 1.  
Source: Sample of 1,390 mothers (child birth between 1987 and 1995) and 307,541 female col-
leagues, drawn from the IAB employment sample, IAB employment supplement sample I, 
Employment statistics register. 
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